We show that loyalty discounts without buyer commitment create an externality among buyers because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. This externality can enable an incumbent to use loyalty discounts to effectively divide the market with its rival and raise prices. We prove that, provided the entrant's cost advantage is not too large, with enough buyers, this externality implies that in any equilibrium some buyers sign loyalty discount contracts, segmenting the market and reducing consumer welfare and total welfare. These propositions are true even if the buyers coordinate, the entrant is more efficient, the loyalty discounts cover less than half the market, and all the loyalty discounts are above cost. We also prove that these propositions hold even if we assume no economies of scale, no downstream competition, no buyer switching costs, no financial constraints, no limits on rival expandability, and no intraproduct bundle of contestable and incontestable demand.
Introduction
The issue of how to treat loyalty discounts has split both the courts and scholars. Courts disagree about whether loyalty discounts should be deemed anticompetitive only when they are below cost.
1 Scholars are likewise divided.
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Part of this disagreement re ects a underlying dispute about how to treat loyalty discounts even they include buyer commitments like in excusive dealing. In a companion paper, we show that loyalty discounts with buyer commitment have stronger anticompetitive e ects than simple exclusive dealing. (Elhauge and Wickelgren 2012) . In this paper, we instead assess loyalty discounts without any buyer commitment, which leave the buyer free to buy elsewhere if a rival o ers a lower price.
Many have analogized loyalty discounts to predatory pricing, especially when the loyalty discount involves no buyer commitment. But even without buyer commitment, loyalty discounts have a crucial di erence from ordinary predatory pricing: loyalty discounts involve a seller commitment to charge loyal buyers less than disloyal buyers.
We show that, even without any buyer commitment, this seller commitment creates distinctive anticompetitive e ects that can make loyalty discounts more akin to market division than to predatory pricing. The reason is that loyalty discounts e ectively divide the market between buyers with a loyalty discount and those without. Because the loyalty discount requires the seller to charge loyal buyers less than buyers who are not covered by the loyalty discount, the seller cannot lower prices to uncovered buyers without also lowering prices to loyal buyers. This makes it more costly for the seller to compete for uncovered buyers and e ectively cedes those buyers to the entrant, which reduces the entrant's incentive to compete aggressively for buyers covered by the loyalty discount. The reduced competition leads to higher consumer prices and lower total welfare. 1 Compare, e.g., Concord Boat v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 2000) (must be below cost), with LePage's v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 147-52 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (need not be). 2 For articles arguing that, like predatory pricing, loyalty discounts presumptively lower prices and cannot harm consumer welfare in the long run unless they are below cost, see Hovenkamp (2005) We prove that as long as the entrant's cost advantage is not too large and there are at least three buyers, loyalty discounts without buyer commitment will soften competition and increase prices above competitive levels, although they cannot completely exclude the entrant from the market. If the entrant and the incumbent choose prices simultaneously or if the incumbent acts as a Stackelberg-leader, the incumbent will never cover more than half the buyers using loyalty discounts without buyer commitment and both the entrant and the incumbent will have positive market-share with positive probability. Thus, loyalty discounts without buyer commitment can also be anticompetitive even if they cover a minority of buyers. Further, these anticompetitive e ects can result even if buyers coordinate, the entrant is more e cient, and all loyalty discounts are above cost.
Some past scholarship has argued that loyalty discounts without buyer commitment can have e ects similar to exclusive dealing. 3 However, those underlying exclusive dealing effects themselves generally assume economies of scale and intermediary buyers who compete downstream. 4 In contrast, the model here demonstrates an anticompetitive e ect that can result without any economies of scale and even with buyers who are nal consumers rather than intermediary competitors. Some have also concluded that loyalty discounts without buyer commitment can create anticompetitive e ects when there exist switching costs, nancial constraints, limits on rival expandability, or buyer demand that is segmented into contestable and incontestable portions that can be e ectively bundled by the loyalty discount.
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Our analysis shows that those assumptions are unnecessary to show anticompetitive e ects given the seller commitment used in loyalty discounts.
The phenomenon identi ed here also di ers sharply from price-matching clauses or most favored nation clauses. Although such clauses also involve seller pricing commitments, they do not involve seller commitments to charge loyal buyers less than other buyers. Pricematching clauses instead involve seller commitments to match rival prices. Loyalty discounts 3 See supra note 2. involve no such seller commitment to match. Indeed, loyalty discounts have the opposite e ect of discouraging sellers from matching rival prices for uncovered buyers. Most-favorednations clauses involve seller commitments to charge agreeing buyers no more than the seller charges other buyers. In contrast, loyalty discounts involve seller commitments to charge agreeing buyers a rmatively less than the seller charges other buyers. We nd that the optimal loyalty discount for the incumbent typically exceeds zero. Further, we nd that loyalty discounts have anticompetitive e ects under very di erent conditions than are assumed in the literature on most-favored nation clauses. Most articles on most favored nations clauses have found anticompetitive e ects because they assumed oligopolistic coordination, see Cooper (1986) , or because they assumed a monopolist selling a durable good that might use such clauses to restrain competition by itself later in time, Butz (1990) ; Marx & Sha er (2004) . None of those assumptions is necessary to show anticompetitive e ects from loyalty discounts under the model o ered here. Indeed, we nd that loyalty discounts can have anticompetitive e ects even in a one-shot game setting.
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Our paper is most similar to Elhauge (2009), which also analyzed loyalty discounts without commitment. However, this paper has some important di erences that generate di erent and more general results. First, his article assumes linear demand and does not allow the potential entrant to be more e cient than the incumbent seller. Our results are more general because we prove our basic results without imposing any speci c functional form on buyer demand (other than weak concavity), and we allow the rival's marginal cost to be less than the incumbent's.
Second, our analysis of loyalty discounts without buyer commitment di ers from Elhauge (2009) in several ways that changes the results. (A) He assumed that buyers will always accept loyalty discounts that do not bind the buyers. We show that this assumption is mistaken. Because loyalty discounts a ect the pricing strategy of both the incumbent and the entrant, buyers might not want to accept loyalty discounts without compensation, even without any buyer commitment. By explicitly modeling buyer acceptance decisions, we are able to determine more accurately the conditions under which the incumbent can use loyalty discounts to elevate market prices without any buyer commitment. (B) Elhauge never formally analyzed the fraction of buyers that the incumbent would cover without economies of scale, o ering instead the conjecture that it would be all but one buyer. We formally analyze the optimal fraction of buyers to whom the incumbent will o er these discounts, showing that with either simultaneous pricing or an incumbent who prices rst, the optimal fraction is in fact always less than half. This distinction has important policy relevance because it means that loyalty discounts without buyer commitment can, without economies of scale, have anticompetitive e ects even when they cover a minority of the market. (C) Because he does not analyze the optimal fraction of buyers that will be covered, he does not correctly establish the prices that will be paid. We show that while loyalty discounts without buyer commitment do enable the incumbent to take market share from a more e cient entrant and elevate prices above the competitive level, they do not lead to monopoly pricing with certainty, contrary to Elhauge (2009).
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 considers the case in which the entrant chooses price rst. Section 4 analyzes the case in which the incumbent is a Stackelberg price leader. Section 5 examines simultaneous pricing. Section 6 concludes.
Proofs not in the text are in the appendix.
Model
An incumbent rm, I, produces a good at constant marginal cost, c. A potential entrant, E, can produce this same good at marginal cost, c e < c. We assume, to highlight the anticompetitive e ects of loyalty discounts, that E incurs no xed cost to enter the market. 
Assumption (*) means that incumbent's pro t from being a monopolist exceeds the increase in consumer surplus that results when buyers purchase at the entrant's monopoly price rather than the incumbents. Because the entrant's monopoly price depends on c e ; this simply requires that c e is not too far below c.
We have four periods in our model, which we label period 1, period 1.5, period 2, and period 3. In period 1, the incumbent o ers a loyalty discount sequentially to buyers of the form fd; tg in which buyers agree to be eligible for the discount of d o the price that I o ers to buyers who do not sign the contract in exchange for a transfer of t from I to the buyer. In period 1.5, E decides whether to enter the market or not. In period 2, E (if active) and I set prices to uncovered buyers of p e and p f respectively (resulting in an I price to covered buyers of p f d if they remain loyal to I and p f if they instead buy from E). If = 0; then there are, in e ect, no loyalty discounts. In that case, because E and I produce 7 Notice, we do not allow I to commit to a price at this time. This could be because the good is hard to describe in period 1. It could be because the cost of production is not precisely known in period 1 (our model could easily accomodate a common shock to production costs). Also, as we discuss in the conclusion, committing to a price rather than a loyalty discount is not as pro table for the incumbent. Thus, agreeing to a loyalty discount simply means that the buyer receives a discount from the price (often called a "list price") o ered to buyers who did not agree to a loyalty contract.
identical products, we have the standard Bertrand result that E captures the entire market at a price of p e = c: In period 3, buyers make purchase decisions.
Suppose that E enters in period 1.5 and I and E set prices p f and p e respectively in period 2. In period 3, if p f d < p e p f ; then the uncovered buyers all purchase from E; and the covered buyers all purchase from I. 8 Thus
If p e > p f ; then all buyers purchase from I:
then all buyers purchase from E; and thus E's pro t is (p e c e )q(p e ) and I's pro t is zero.
In the following sections, we consider separately the cases in which the entrant chooses its price rst, the incumbent chooses its price rst, and simultaneous pricing.
Entrant Chooses Price First
If the entrant chooses a price p e ; then the incumbent will either choose p f = p e " and sell to the entire market or it will choose p f = p e + d " and sell only to covered buyers. Letting " ! 0; we have that the incumbent sells only to covered buyers if and only if the following holds:
Clearly, the entrant would never choose a price for which this condition does not hold, because then it would earn zero pro ts. The left hand side is decreasing in p e as long as pro ts are concave in prices and p e < p m : Furthermore, the left hand side is clearly positive at p e = c for any d > 0: Thus, the incumbent will sell only to covered buyers so long as the entrant chooses a small enough price (which can exceed c). If the discount is large enough, it is possible that the incumbent will sell only to covered buyers even if p e = p m e : Let p e be the price that satis es (1) at equality if it exists and is smaller than p m e ; or alternatively, p m e : By totally di erentiating (1) with respect to ; we can determine how p e varies with for p e < p m e :
This is positive for < 1=2 because the incumbent's pro t is greater at p e than p e d because p e p m e and because the incumbent's pro t is increasing at both p e and p e d. Thus, for < 1=2 (and for larger we can see that p e = p m e ), p e is increasing in : That is, the higher the share of buyers covered by the loyalty discount, the higher the price the entrant can choose without the incumbent undercutting this price for uncovered buyers (which would eliminate the entrant's pro t). Thus, (1) implicitly de nes p e as a non-decreasing (strictly increasing when p e p m e ) function of : The entrant can also choose p e = c and sell to all buyers. It will prefer to choose p e if and only if:
Clearly, this is only satis ed if ; the fraction of covered buyers, is not too large.
The entrant will never choose a price higher than p 
The reason is that if this inequality is satis ed, then the incumbent earns more pro t from selling only to covered buyers at the entrant's monopoly price than it would earn from selling to uncovered buyers at the entrant's monopoly price and selling to covered buyers at a price of zero (which would give it losses of cq (0) It remains to be seen whether or not the incumbent can induce this fraction of buyers to agree to be covered by a loyalty discount. While one might think that this is trivial because agreeing to the discount involves does not bind a buyer, this is does not mean that agreeing is necessarily costless to the buyer. As the fraction of covered buyers increases, as long as it is below^ or 1=2; the greater is the price the entrant will choose. Because the incumbent chooses a price so that the discounted price just undercuts the entrant's price, this means that agreeing to be covered by the discount can increase the price the buyer expects to pay if the buyer expects that enough other buyers will choose not to be covered by the discount.
In this case, the incumbent might have to pay buyers to induce them to be covered.
Whether this will be possible will depend on the number of buyers and the entrant's cost advantage. If there are only two buyers, for example, then buyers will never agree to be covered by loyalty discounts without buyer commitment for any up-front payment that the incumbent would be willing to make. The incumbent would never want to cover both buyers because then the entrant would have to charge c to stop the incumbent from undercutting it.
If the incumbent signs up only one buyer, then this buyer loses consumer surplus because of the higher price, but the incumbent only gains from the higher price through sales to this one buyer. Because elevating prices above costs is ine cient (increased pro ts are less than lost consumer surplus), the incumbent cannot pay one buyer to accept. With only one covered buyer, there is no negative externality on other buyers that the incumbent can bene t from (there is a negative externality, but this bene ts the entrant who sells to the uncovered buyer at a higher price). With more buyers, however, it is possible for the incumbent to pro tably induce enough buyers to sign the loyalty discount contract so that prices are elevated to p m e as long as the entrant's cost advantage is not too great. Proof. See Appendix If the incumbent can o er an arbitrarily large discount, then the incumbent never wants to sell to both covered and uncovered buyers because charging a price that meets the entrant's price for uncovered buyers will result in arbitrarily large losses from selling to each covered buyer. Thus, having one covered buyer is su cient to ensure that prices are at the entrant's monopoly price. So, once the incumbent has signed up one buyer, all remaining buyers expect to pay the entrant's monopoly price whether they are covered or not. Hence they will sign up for a trivial side-payment. In order to ensure that one buyer will sign up, the incumbent has to be willing to pay that one buyer her loss of consumer surplus from paying the monopoly price rather than the competitive price. But, if it is pro table to do so, the incumbent need not actually pay this amount because buyers prior to N N expect the One might think that this is easier to satisfy as the entrant's costs are smaller because the lost consumer surplus is smaller. However, smaller entrant costs also reduce ; the maximum fraction of buyers that can be covered without the entrant charging c and selling to all buyers. It turns out that this latter e ect matters more when the entrant's innovation is close to drastic ((8) is decreasing in c e when c e is such that p m e = c). But, if the entrant's costs are close to the incumbent's 10 and demand is concave, then the incumbent can always induce enough buyers to agree to be covered for a trivial side-payment, leading the market to be divided between the incumbent and the entrant, with all buyers paying the entrant's optimal monopoly price. Thus, even without committing buyers to buy only from the incumbent, if the entrant prices rst, loyalty discounts can lead to a divided market and higher prices.
9 If the rst buyer to sign believes that her signing will induce all the others to sign, but that none will sign if she does not, then her lost consumer surplus from signing is exactly s(c) s(p m e ): All subsequent buyers have a smaller lost consumer surplus since even if all later buyers reject, the price will be elevated above c due to the earlier buyers being covered. Thus, s(c) s(p m e ) is an upper bound on the lost consumer surplus per buyer.
10 (8) is increasing in c e at c e = c; so satisfying this condition becomes harder as c e falls from c.
Incumbent Chooses Price First
If the incumbent chooses its price to free buyers, p f , rst, then the entrant will either choose to price at p e = M infp f ; p m e g {selling only to uncovered buyers{or the entrant will choose p e = M infp f d; p m e g and sell to all buyers. Because the incumbent makes zero pro t in the latter case, for any given fraction of covered buyers, , the incumbent must choose a price p f such that the entrant prefers to sell only to uncovered buyers. That is, p f must satisfy:
Unlike when the entrant chooses price rst, here the left hand side of (4) is decreasing in ;
which means that the p f that satis es (4) at equality is decreasing in : Furthermore, notice that if (4) holds, covered buyers pay p f d while uncovered buyers pay M infp f ; p m e g: Thus, unlike when the entrant prices rst, here agreeing to be covered is a dominant strategy for buyers as long as one buyer will be covered. Whether or not the incumbent must pay to cover one buyer if all other buyers have rejected being covered depends on the pricing equilibrium with no covered buyers. With no covered buyers, the incumbent earns zero for any price p f c and loses money on any lower price. Thus, there is no unique equilibrium with no covered buyers: buyers could face any price between c and p m e because the incumbent has zero sales and pro ts for any price in this region.
11 It will be the most di cult for the incumbent to get buyers to agree to be covered by a loyalty discount if they believe the equilibrium with no covered buyers will result in a price of c: In that case, the incumbent would have to be willing to pay one buyer compensation. But, if buyers believe the incumbent will do that, then all buyers will agree to be covered for no compensation because they expect at least one covered buyer and they pay lower prices if they sign up both because covered buyers pay less than uncovered ones and because both prices are lower when there are more covered buyers.
Thus, the incumbent can certainly cover any fraction of buyers at no cost so long as it could pro tably compensate one buyer for its lost consumer surplus (and possibly without needing to be able to pro tably compensate any buyers 
We then use this in di erentiating the incumbent's pro t to obtain the rst order condition for :
The right hand side of (5) 
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One might think that the incumbent would choose a larger because while that would reduce period 3 pro ts, it would reduce the amount of compensation required to ensure one buyer agrees to be covered. That isn't the case, however, because the incumbent does not have to actually pay this compensation.
As long as it would be willing to compensate enough buyers, buyers will agree to be covered for no compensation because they expect the number of other buyers that will be covered will be such that uncovered buyers will pay p m e : Whereas, if they agree to be covered, they will pay p d < p m e : We have now proved the following result.
Proposition 2 If the incumbent chooses price rst, it will cover a fraction of buyers

1=2
by a loyalty discount without buyer commitment and covered buyers will agree to be
The fraction of buyers that will be covered is increasing in c e and is 1=2 at c e = c: Covered buyers will pay p d ; which is strictly greater than c but strictly less than p m e : uncovered buyers will pay p m e :
Thus, if the incumbent chooses price rst, then it can use loyalty discounts without buyer commitment to ensure that it makes positive pro ts and continues to serve a fraction of the market despite its higher costs. Whether consumers pay higher prices or not depends on what the equilibrium outcome is absent loyalty discounts, which is uncertain given that there is a continuum of equilibria.
Simultaneous Pricing
We now consider the case in which the entrant and incumbent choose their prices simultaneously in period 2. It turns out that this case has a great deal in common with the case in which the incumbent chooses price rst.
With simultaneous pricing, however, the pricing equilibrium must be in mixed strategies.
To see this, imagine that the entrant chose a price p e . Then the incumbent would choose a discounted price (p d) just below p e in order to sell to covered buyers. The entrant's best response to such a price, however, would be either to match it or choose p m e and sell only to uncovered buyers. Because the entrant's best response to a price just below p m e would be to match it, there can be no pure strategy equilibrium.
We rst assume that the discount, d, is large enough that the incumbent cannot pro tably compete for buyers who did not accept the loyalty discount (uncovered buyers), even if the entrant prices at its monopoly level. We establish that this is optimal for the incumbent in the Appendix. To determine the mixed strategy equilibrium, notice that if the entrant's price distribution is given by the cumulative distribution function F e ; then the incumbent's expected period 2 pro t from a discounted price of p d is (1 F e (p d )) 
This implies that
with an atom at p 
Notice that p 0; the minimum of both price distributions, is decreasing in (the condition for p 0 implies that dp 0 =d = (p 14 Since p 0 c; this creates a maximum for the mixed strategy equilibrium. For any above this maximum, the entrant will charge c with probability one. Obviously, any above this maximum will not be in the interest of the incumbent, since it will earn zero pro ts. The maximum = 1 (c ce)q(c) (p m e ce)q(p m e ) : 15 In equilibrium,the incumbent's maximum price cannot exceed the entrant's maximum price or the incumbent would make no pro ts. Thus, the entrant only sells to uncovered buyers at its maximum price. Given this, the entrant's maximum price must be p in p 0 (and the atom at p m e is increasing in p 0 ); and F (p e ) is increasing in : This means that the larger the fraction of covered buyers, the lower the prices (in expectation) that buyers will face from both the entrant and the incumbent. Thus, once one buyer is covered, other buyers strictly prefer to be covered than uncovered. Hence, as was the case when the incumbent chose price rst, the incumbent need only be able to pro tably compensate one buyer in order to induce as many buyers as it wants to be covered. In this case, however, the unique equilibrium with no covered buyers is the competitive one, so there is no doubt about the fact that the incumbent must be able to pro tably compensate one buyer.
Once again, then, we simply need to determine the fraction of covered buyers that maximizes the incumbent's pro ts given the pricing distributions. The incumbent's expected pro t is simply (p 0 c)q(p 0 ) (because he can charge p 0 and sell to all covered buyers with probability one). Using the expression for dp 0 =d in the last paragraph, the rst order condition for is:
is the exact same condition for as when the incumbent chose price rst (see equation (5)) with p d replaced by p 0 : But, also notice the condition for p 0 here is identical for the condition for p d in the last subsection. Hence, the optimal fraction of buyers that the incumbent will choose to cover is identical (it will be exactly half if c = c e and less than half if the entrant has a cost advantage). The only di erence between the equilibria in the two cases is that (i) the incumbent's price is higher in the simultaneous pricing case because instead of charging p d = p 0 with probability one, he charges price drawn from a distribution between p 0 and p m e ; and (ii) the entrant's price is lower because instead of charging p m e with probability one, it charges a price drawn from a distribution between p 0 and p Given that the incumbent's period 2 pro ts are identical in the two cases as is the fraction of covered buyers, we have proven the following result.
Proposition 3 If the incumbent and entrant choose price simultaneously, the incumbent will cover a fraction of buyers 1=2 by a loyalty discount without buyer commitment and covered buyers will agree to be covered for no compensation if s(c) s(p 0 )
The fraction of buyers that will be covered is increasing in c e and is 1=2 at c e = c: Both covered and uncovered buyers will pay a price between p 0 and p m e :
This proposition establishes that with simultaneous pricing, the incumbent can use loyalty discounts without buyer commitment to prevent the entrant from capturing the entire market, leading both to production ine ciency and prices that are elevated above the competitive level along with the associated allocation ine ciency. In fact, as we have seen, we get similar results no matter what the period 2 pricing game is. While (given the assumed market conditions) loyalty discounts without buyer commitment cannot exclude the entrant from the entire market, they can ensure that the incumbent retains positive market share (despite its relative ine ciency) and maintains supra-competitive prices.
The above proposition assumes that the incumbent has chosen a large enough discount that, in equilibrium, even if the entrant charges its monopoly price, it will sell to all uncovered buyers. We show in the Appendix that the incumbent will not choose a smaller discount that does not satisfy that property. We do this by showing that, with any discount that does not satisfy that property, there exists an equilibrium in which the incumbent earns lower pro ts.
Conclusion
This article has shown that loyalty discounts without buyer commitment can increase prices by producing a form of market division. The results hold for any weakly concave demand curve and even if the loyalty discount is above cost, the entrant is more e cient than the incumbent, and the loyalty discounts cover less than half the market. The results also hold even if the buyers are nal consumers (or otherwise have independent demand) and can coordinate with each other. Unless the entrant cost advantage is su ciently large, this equilibrium with anticompetitive e ects will always occur if there are at least three buyers.
Morever, we prove these results even though we assume the absence of entry costs, economies of scale, buyer switching costs, nancial constraints, limited rival expandabil-ity, and any intraproduct bundle of contestable and incontestable demand. Although prior literature suggests that loyalty discounts can have additional anticompetitive e ects when those market conditions exist, this paper proves that loyalty discounts can have an important anticompetitive even without those market conditions. These results show that the intuition that loyalty discounts presumptively reduce prices is misplaced. Loyalty "discounts" just mean there exists a di erence between loyal and disloyal pricing, and thus need not signify any true discount from the but-for prices that would have existed but for the loyalty discounts. In fact, because the existence of loyalty discounts changes the strategic game between the buyer and the seller, we show that loyalty discounts encourage incumbents to raise prices above but-for levels for both free buyers and buyers who receive the loyalty discount.
Our results have important implications for how competition policy should treat loyalty discounts without buyer commitments. First, such loyalty discounts can be anticompetitive even when they are above cost. Indeed, raising even the loyal prices above but-for levels (and thus well above cost) is precisely the anticompetitive e ect. Second, such loyalty discounts can be anticompetitive when they cover only a minority of buyers. In fact, covering a minority of buyers is part the incumbent's optimal anticompetitive strategy under simultaneous pricing or if the incumbent prices rst. Third, loyalty discounts can be anticompetitive without showing the sorts of market conditions (like economies of scale or intermediary buyers) that may be necessary to show that exclusive dealing is anticompetitive. Fourth, loyalty discounts can also be anticompetitive without the sorts of market conditions (like switching costs or intraproduct bundling of contestable and incontestable demand) that past models have used to explain how loyalty discounts without buyer commitment can have exclusionary anticompetitive e ects.
Our model assumes that the incumbent only o ers a discount o a price to be determined later. We explained above, in footnote 7, why specifying price in advance might not be possible (this is the standard assumption in the exclusive dealing literature). Moreover, since the incumbent is not requiring buyers to commit to buying from it, it is natural that it would not need to commit to a price at this time. Evn if the incumbent could o er a contract that speci ed price in advance, this would not be as pro table for the incumbent unless the contract somehow linked the price it o ered to loyal buyers to the price if o ered to disloyal buyers. It is this linking of price that creates the externality across buyers that allows the incumbent to retain market share and earn pro ts even though this reduces total welfare. If the incumbent could credibly commit to a price to both loyal buyers and disloyal buyers, then it would commit to charge disloyal buyers a price above the entrant's monopoly price and charging loyal buyers the same price, p d ; as in Proposition 2 when the incumbent chooses price rst. We then get the exact same equilibrium as in Proposition 2.
Two limitations should be stressed. First, we have assumed a market with only one potential rival. This can often be the case, especially in high-tech or pharmaceutical markets, but if there were multiple rivals with similar costs it is possible they would compete prices down to their costs. However, the same sort of analysis seems likely to apply to the extent only one entrant has a potential cost advantage and the other rivals have higher costs and merely provide a competitive fringe. Multiple rivals might also use loyalty discounts themselves, creating similar or even exacerbated market segmentation e ects. 16 But it remains for future work to extend the model here to cases involving multiple rivals or where multiple rms use loyalty discounts.
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Second, we have assumed loyalty discounts have no e ciencies. If they did, those might o set any adverse e ects. It seems likely the present model can be extended to show how much of a cost reduction would be necessary to o set the anticompetitive e ects, but that also remains a matter for future work. If the incumbent cannot charge a negative price, then the maximum loss it can su er from selling to covered buyers is cq(0): Given this, the entrant will choose p m e if and only if the fraction of covered buyers is at least^ but less than : Thus, once the incumbent haŝ N covered buyers, all remaining buyers up until N do not require compensation to be covered because they will pay the same price, p m e , whether they are covered or not because the entrant will o er a price of p m e once there are^ N covered buyers but not more than N covered buyers. We will assume the worst case for making such compensation pro table.
Speci cally, we will ask if the incumbent can obtain agreement to be covered from N buyers when N N buyers have already rejected the o er. We will then assume that remaining buyers believe that if they reject the incumbent's o er, then all future buyers will reject, but if they accept, then enough buyers will accept (^ N buyers) so that they will face a price of p m e . Lastly, contrary to fact, we will assume that even when some buyers have already accepted, until^ N buyers have accepted, the buyers believe that rejecting the o er will enable them to buy at the competitive price of c. We make this assumption simply because for a general demand curve, we cannot get an explicit formula for p e as a function of the number of buyers who have already accepted. Thus,^ N buyers must receive compensation of s(c) s(p m e ): This means it is pro table for the incumbent to get N buyers to accept if:
Substituting for and^ ; we can write this as: Hence, the rst buyer approached will accept being covered for only a trivial side-payment, which means that all subsequent buyers approached will also.
(C) This follows from the proof of (B) because this proof continues to be valid if we take 0 = 0; as would be the case if the discounted price equals the incumbent's cost. Q.E.D.
Proof that large discount is optimal in section 5
Next, we show that in the simultaneous pricing case without commitment, that the incumbent will choose a large enough discount so that it will not sell to uncovered buyers in equilibrium. First, note that if (c c e )q(c) In this intermediate case, we construct a mixed strategy equilibrium of the same type as the equilibrium with a large discount. The key di erence is that the top price charged with positive probability,which we will call p T ; and the bottom price charged, p B , must be smaller to satisfy the no deviation condition. p T and p B still satisfy (p B c e )q(p B ) =
(1 )(p T c e )q(p T ); so that the entrant is indi erent between selling only to uncovered buyers (with probability one) at p T and selling to all buyers (with probability one) at p B :
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The entrant's price distribution is given by F e (p d ) = 1
with an atom at p T of (p 0 c)q(p 0 ) (p T c)q(p T )
: The incumbent's distribution is given by F (p e ) = (pe ce)q(pe) (1 )(p T ce)q(p T ) (pe ce)q(pe)
:
The analysis above shows that these distributions guarantee that both the incumbent and the entrant are indi erent between charging any (discounted for the incumbent) price in the interval between p B and p T :
When the discount is small, however, it remains to show that the incumbent does not want to deviate to a discounted price of p T d in order to sell to uncovered buyers at p T in the event that the entrant charges p T (and to all covered buyers with probability one at p T d). The incumbent's expected pro t from charging a discounted price of p T d: It is worth pointing out that the equilibrium in this case is di erent from the equilibrium described in Elhauge (2009) for simultaneous pricing without commitment and a small discount. In Elhauge's proposed equilibrium, the incumbent could pro tably deviate by charging a discounted price just below the support of his distribution that allows him to sell to uncovered buyers with non-zero probability because the entrant has an atom in its distribution at its highest price.
